Who Makes US Foreign Policy?

Introduction: There are several actors and stakeholders that ought to be discussed in order to determine who determines the U.S. foreign policy. Some of those actors are enshrined in the constitutional provisions for the separation of institutional power in every sphere of governance, including in the foreign affairs related matters. This separation of power that is aimed at allowing checks and balances also granted the three major institutional organs of power, namely the executive, legislative and the judiciary, to influence foreign policy in the United States of America. According to Dobson and Marsh, “formal power in foreign policy-making lies largely with the Executive and the Legislature: the Judiciary has only a peripheral role” (Dobson and Marsh, 2006, p. 8).   The manner in which this shared responsibility, as established in the constitution, is defined will help determine who actually determines the foreign policies. Apart from the aforementioned actors, there are other stakeholders in the foreign policy decision.

These stakeholders include ethnic pressure groups, such as the Jewish and Latino communities, whose public opinion and lobby strategies propel ancestral, ethnic, economic and political interests into political public debate in the U.S.  Mearsheimer and Walt defined these important stakeholders and contended that “In the United States, interest groups routinely contend to shape perceptions of the national interest and to convince legislators and presidents to adopt their preferred policies” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p. 111). Nevertheless, their influence in decisions regarding foreign relations seems to be less determinant, compared to that of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was established under the presidency and has gained notoriety for accommodating several agencies that routinely supply intelligence reports, which are often used to determine aspects that are of interest to the nation, to both the Congress and the President.

A careful evaluation of congressional, presidential and judicial institutional functions will help to structure the essay discussion as well as to ascertain the manner in which the U.S. foreign policy is shaped within the constitutional prerogative of separation of powers. This is in consideration of the assertion of Killian, Costello and Thomas that “The doctrine of separation of powers, as implemented in drafting the Constitution, was based on several principles generally held: the separation of government into three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial…” (Killian, Costello and Thomas, 2004, p. 64) Other stakeholders, such as the lobbyists and ethnic groups – especially the Israeli lobby – will be introduced in order to illustrate their modus operandi and their impact on U.S. foreign policy. Emphasis on the activities of the National Security Council will indicate my inclination towards the answer to the essay question.

Body of the essay:

An evaluation of some legal establishments on foreign policy matter, as enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, allows margin for broader political discourse and institutional squabbles, due to the cautiousness of the constitutional fathers in trying to ensure that power is properly distributed. Therefore, it is correct to assume that ‘In the area of foreign affairs, the Constitution does not establish a strict, legalized process for decision making. Instead, it establishes a flexible system permitting a variety of procedures’ (Yoo, 2005, p. 10). Yet, the underpinning issue here is the existence of two organs of power, each having a legal authority to decide the manner in which America is represented in the world. In areas of diplomacy, trade, military and legislation, each is endowed with constitutional rights that can be interpreted relatively to suit a particular purpose and definition. Quirk and Binder summarized the role of both the Congress and the Executive in major policy decisions of foreign relations and stated that “In foreign policy, which generally involved treaty making and diplomacy, executive authority and capacity would predominate. In defence and commercial policy, which necessarily involved taxation and legislation, Congress would predominate” (Quirk and Binder, 2005, p. 352) In order to understand this succinct explanation of the functions of these arms of government, it is important to consult the U.S Constitution itself in order to review the proper terms in which the laws are stipulated.

 For example, while Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants the Congress sole powers “to regulate commerce with foreign nations…declare war…and to make laws which shall be necessary  and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,…,” (Sullivan, 2011, pp. 60-1), Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution explicitly prohibits the President and States in the Union from “…entering into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engaging in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay…without the consent of the congress…”(Sullivan, 2011, pp. 65-6) The discourse here, therefore,  is on the reconciliation of powers to declare war with the power to conduct wars; because, while the Congress enjoys the exclusive right to declare war, the President also enjoys an equal exclusive right to conduct war, as the commander- in-chief of the armed forces of the United States of America. In other words, can either of the two organs of power manage this important foreign policy tool exclusively? Perhaps, for this reason, John Yoo affirmed that “…the Constitution requires that the President and the Congress share the authority in foreign affairs and that the federal courts adjudicate disputes between the branches to enforce that principle” (Yoo, 2005, p. 6). Moreover, if this affirmation is true, what is the influence and impact of those aforementioned stakeholders in the U.S. foreign relations policies?

In reality, the Executive and congressional divide in foreign affairs material leaves the Congress with many options of influencing decisions. The congress can determine the country´s foreign policy by passing legislations which hinder the efforts of the executive branch in a particular area of interest. They can also block government appointments or funds meant for the continuity of such foreign relations policy. One example is the refusal of the Senate to cast a vote on Ambassador John Bolton´s UN appointment confirmation hearing. The refusal to confirm President GW Bush´s choice of the U.S. representative to the UN created a foreign affairs power tussle between the two arms of the government. One arm has the power to legislate and confirm official appointments; the other has the constitutional powers to appoint and oversee diplomacy-related issues. Mackenzie stated that “a nominee´s weakness may become a convenient peg on which to hang policy disagreement…” (Mackenzie, 2001, p.28) President GW Bush used executive powers in Article II, Section 2 (Clause 3) of the Constitution, which stated that “the President shall have the power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate…” (Sullivan, 2011, p. 72).This was done to effectuate the appointment of Ambassador Bolton to the United Nations until the maximum duration of time granted by law. There is a wide belief that voting was denied for his nomination in the Senate committee, as the committee was interested in establishing some level of authority and relevance in foreign policy questions against President Bush´s deliberate intent to provoke a political clash with the Congress. Mackenzie asserted that “Senators vote against nominees, and nominations fail, because the appointment process has become a policy battleground” (Mackenzie, 2001, pp.27-8). In view of this action of the Senate, it is clearly understood that the Congress can use its legislative powers to block the foreign policy of Presidents and exact its relevance on that subject. Evidently, the Constitution of the United States of America has consented to this policy dilemma between the Executive and the Congress.

Analysts and political scholars have evaluated this fundamental provision of the law and have criticized or applauded it for one reason or another.  Some consider the Congress as the bearers of U.S foreign policy and that the Executive has substantial powers to determine how it is run; however, critics see a clash between both the arms of power, especially in the important area of U.S. foreign policies, which concerns the military and the declaration of war.  On this note, Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh stated that “The President´s power as CIC to commit US military forces overseas is extensive, but limited by both the Congress´s constitutional prerogative to declare war and the War Powers Act (1973)” (Dobson and Marsh, 2006, p. 9). It has been a major source of contention between the Executive and Congress and, more recently, was back in the public debate over President Obama´s commitment of the U.S. military in a NATO led intervention in Libya. Critics had raised a constitutional question over the involvement of the U.S. military in Libya and the President´s role in that decision, until it was realized that the War Power Act of 1973 also “…allows a president to commit troops to action overseas only for a maximum of 90 days without congressional approval” (Dobson and Marsh, 2006, p. 9). Remarkably, the War Power Act of 1973 was enacted under Article II, Section 2 (Clause 2) constitutional prerogative which, apart from specifying presidential powers and congressional required consent, also stated that “…the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments” (Sullivan, 2011, p. 71). This means that the Constitution allows Congress to regulate its constitutional powers and obligation and also to transfer jurisdiction of this matter to other institutions in the state.

Consequently, the Congress made efforts to delegate some of its powers to the President in order to facilitate the governance of the country and a rapid decision making process. According to Dobson and Marsh ,“the control of foreign trade and commerce…has been delegated extensively to the President since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, but what the Congress can delegate, it can recall” (Dobson and Marsh, 2006, p. 10). This allowed and gave rise to the creation of the office of the Commerce Secretary by the Executive, along with the necessary powers and relevance to conduct foreign trade relationships with friendly countries across the world.

However, U.S. foreign policy making does not depend entirely on the institutions that have legal obligations for deciding a particular focus and area of national interest. Other power groups including the National Security Council (NSC) and the ethnic groups are also well-acknowledged by theorists and political analysts. Wittkof and McCormick asserted that “…the organizations constituting the foreign affairs government are often described as “fourth branch of government” (Wittkopf and McCormick, 2004, p. 137). This so-called “fourth branch of government” consists of agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pentagon, the State department, etc., whose technical activities greatly influence foreign policy decisions. A similar consideration can be made about ethnic groups whose lobbyists have also contributed to the defining of the ‘national interest’ rhetoric in the U.S. foreign relations politics. This rhetoric has consolidated the influence of one of the most powerful U.S. ethnic political pressure groups – the Israeli lobbyists. Their method seems to be based on the tradition carried over the years, of conveying the political and economic needs of their ancestral home into the primary interest of the U.S.  John Mearsheimer strongly stated that “the Israel lobby has successfully convinced many Americans that American and Israeli interests are essentially identical” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p. 8). Primarily, the U.S. foreign policies with respect to the Middle-East tend to be inclined to the needs of Israel. Evidence shows that “…AIPAC does have a strategic advantage in the current policymaking environment, at least in comparison to groups that may oppose strong US relations with Israel, because it is protecting the status quo” (Paul and Paul, 2009, p.15). This implies that Israel enjoys enormous political privilege over other U.S. allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Moreover, their leverage is the most courted Jewish vote which, virtually, every successful U.S. politician covets towards the proximity of an election.

On the other hand, the President seems to have exploited the incompetence and the lack of knowledge of the bearers of foreign policy constitutional rights on this subject and created an organization in which its functions in foreign policies are exclusively created and designed to influence and facilitate decisions on this material. It was, perhaps, a smart move by the executive powers to funnel the monopoly of foreign policy decisions to their inclination. Rothkopf, in allusion to NSC, stated that “the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security…” (Rothkopf, 2005, p. 5) Their advice and annual policy reports may have systematically afforded the presidency a vital tool in influencing congressional decisions on foreign affairs. NSC was legitimized under “the National Security Act of 1947” which “…created the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency…” (Rothkopf, 2005, p. 5) These are powerful military organizations with strong influence among the U.S. public and the government. The advice or recommendations of any of the above- mentioned organizations are not easily discarded either by the Congress or the Executive. In fact, they serve the needs of both organs of power. In case of the Congress, it provides insights for any ongoing investigation of the president’s action, while for the President it helps to sway congressional decisions in his/her favour. The NSC is seen by many political analysts as the brain behind U.S. foreign affairs and, in most cases, it works discreetly in designing, influencing and facilitating foreign policy decisions.

Conclusion:                                                                              

The foreign relations policy of the United States of America seems to be motivated by a combination of jurisdictional considerations, between the Executive and the Congress, whose legal endowment is enshrined in the U.S fundamental law and other political ramifications – such as ethnic political pressure groups – that influence foreign relations policy in the day-to-day politics of the country. In this essay, I have endeavoured to discuss every area of U.S. foreign policy influence, namely, the Congress, Executive, Judiciary, Ethnic groups and the National Security Council (NSC). I have argued that legal provisions in the U.S. Constitution allowed controversy in the power sharing spirit of the constitutional fathers. I contended that the one good thing is that it allowed broader political discussion in subjects related to foreign policy. The judiciary was not extensively discussed, as it is uncommon for the judiciary to interfere in the foreign relations policy, except adjudicate on constitutional questions and conflict arising from both the Congress and the President.

I mentioned numerous ways by which the Executive or the Congress can manoeuvre to undermine the jurisdiction of either branch of the government and the institutional power. Additionally, I conceded that the Executive powers of the President of the United States of America through the office of the Secretary of State, Defence Department and numerous agencies under the National Security Commission (NSC) shape and define the foreign relation policy of the country. However, the Congress, through its committee on foreign relations, makes recommendations to the President by means of policy report and uses deterrents, such as cutting off foreign relations fund (or aid) in order to impose its foreign policy interest. However, the delegation of congressional powers to the President was considered as a positive step towards facilitating governance and rapid decision making on foreign policies. I mentioned that it allowed the President a 90 day grace period to bypass Congress for committing the U.S. military in wars anywhere in the world. It also facilitated effective engagement in trade negotiations with other countries, which became the competence of the Commerce Secretary.

On the influence of the NSC in policy making, I contended that in the absence of the constitutional prerogative on congressional and executive powers and duties, the NSC eventually runs the U.S. foreign policy. I argued that its composition by different powerful organs and agencies serve as an effective material means for the executive powers to maintain systematic control and monopoly in foreign relations policy. What becomes the U.S. national interest is, therefore, defined within the scope of military, economic and ideological assumed threats from other nations. The Congress is susceptible to adopting measures based on the NSC´s reports and conclusions and policies for foreign relations are made easy for the President who presides over the commission. 

Finally, the magnitude of American public ignorance of the political discourse around foreign policy has considerably reduced the rhetoric of ‘national interest’ to what is obvious in the minds of the people. So, powerful ethnic groups, such as the Israelis and Latinos tend to easily convince the U.S. government and public that their interests and needs are the ‘national interest’ of the U.S.  I cited Mearsheimer, in order to bring forth the relevance of Israeli lobbyists in shaping U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle-east.

Bibliography

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Killian J. H., Costello G.A. and Thomas K. R. (2004) The Constitution of the United States of America: analysis and interpretation: analysis of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002 (Vol. 108, Issue 17 of Senate Document). Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

 Mackenzie, G. C. (ed.) (2001) In Innocent until nominated: the breakdown of the presidential appointments process, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001

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